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A national survey of 1,001 Australians found that most
were concerned about a bioterrorist attack and were ill-
informed about smallpox prevention and response. Since
general practitioners were commonly identified as the initial
point of care, they should become a focus of bioterrorism
response planning in Australia.
A
ustralia has identified protection against bioterrorism
as a national research priority, and the Common-
wealth Chief Medical Officer emphasizes the “need to be
prepared for a bioterrorism incident” (1). Preparations
have focused on central public health surveillance, with lit-
tle attention to public understanding of bioterrorism (2). 
Smallpox and anthrax are considered potential bioter-
rorism agents (1,3,4). Although smallpox response guide-
lines have been prepared for Australia (http://www.health.
gov.au/internet/wcms/Publishing.nsf/Content/health-
pubhlth-publicat-document-metadata-smallpox.htm), the
level of community awareness of these recommendations
is unknown. In the event of an attack, the response of the
public will be based on persons’ current knowledge,
beliefs, and patterned behavior (5,6). We conducted a
cross-sectional national survey in Australia to assess
knowledge and views about smallpox, vaccination, and
other mitigation strategies. 
The Study
A list of private telephone numbers was randomly
selected for each of Australia’s 8 states and territories that
was proportional to their contribution to the adult popula-
tion. Participants were recruited to provide a sample size
of 1,000, which allowed a precision of 2%–3% when cal-
culating a 95% confidence interval of a dichotomous vari-
able with a base proportion ranging from 10% to 50%. 
Eight experienced telephone interviewers conducted
the survey during July 2004. Repeat calls were conducted
when persons indicated interest in participating but were
unable to do so during the initial contact. The question-
naire was administered upon agreement to participate,
after introducing the survey’s purpose, providing a guaran-
tee of confidentiality, and giving reassurance of freedom to
withdraw consent. 
The questionnaire was pretested for length and compre-
hensibility in a pilot study during May 2004. The final
instrument took 10–15 minutes to administer and con-
tained 22 questions. Data were analyzed by using SPSS for
Windows version 11 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Ethical approval was granted by the human ethics subcom-
mittee at James Cook University (Nr. H1745). 
Atotal of 1,001 Australian adults completed the survey.
Two hundred thirteen were excluded (38 children, 91
adults with limited English ability, 9 incoherent adults, and
75 adults contacted at their workplace), and 582 refused to
participate (response rate 63.2%). Respondents were geo-
graphically representative of the Australian population. 
Respondents’ ages were normally distributed (mean
52.2 years, standard deviation 17 years) and 62.8% (629)
were female. Most (58.6%, 587) lived in cities, which
reflected the situation in Australia, where 66.3% of the
population live in urban areas. The level of education of
respondents reflected that of the Australian population. 
Concern about the risk of a bioterrorist attack in
Australia was perceived as high by 182 (18.2%), medium
by 392 (39.2%), low by 339 (33.9%), and nonexistent by
14 (1.4%); 72 (7.2%) did not know and 2 (0.2%) did not
answer. Logistic regression modeling showed that age was
the only demographic feature significantly associated with
perceiving high risk of a bioterrorist attack (compared with
low, medium, or none), with an odds ratio of 1.016 per
year (p<0.001). 
Most respondents (60.6%, 606) believed that human
smallpox cases had occurred in the past 5 years and that
effective medical treatment existed for smallpox (Table 1).
The likelihood of contracting smallpox by working in
close contact with someone with the disease (e.g., in the
same office) was considered low by 157 (15.7%), medium
by 163 (16.3%), and high by 419 (41.9%); 261 (26.1%) did
not know and 1 (0.1%) did not answer. 
A total of 583 (58.2%) respondents stated that they had
been vaccinated against smallpox; 346 (34.6%) indicated
no prior vaccination against smallpox, 71 (7.1%) did not
know, and 1 (0.1%) did not answer. Among 61 respondents
born since 1979, the year that smallpox was eradicated and
worldwide childhood vaccination terminated, 32 (52.5%)
indicated that they had not been vaccinated against small-
pox, 20 (32.8%) reported that they had been vaccinated,
and 9 (14.8%) did not know. Of 841 respondents born
before 1980, 502 (59.8%) reported that they had been vac-
cinated against smallpox. 
The acceptance of vaccination against smallpox under
specific hypothetical scenarios was explored. Vaccination
would be accepted as an immediate precautionary measure
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USAby 41.7% of respondents, while 42.3%, 48.9%, and 56.3%
would accept vaccination if cases were reported some-
where in the world, Australia, or their own community,
respectively. Among respondents who did not report previ-
ous vaccination, 44.5% would accept vaccination as a pre-
cautionary measure (Table 2). 
Modeling the readiness to accept vaccination showed
that older persons were less likely to accept smallpox vac-
cination (odds ratio 0.977 per year, p<0.001). Respondents
with more education were also less likely to accept vacci-
nation under any scenario (odds ratio 0.845 per education
category, p<0.01).
When asked in an open-ended question where they
would first seek diagnosis or care if they thought they had
contracted smallpox, 591 (59.0%) respondents mentioned
their general practitioner (family physician). Hospital
emergency departments were indicated by 330 (33.0%), a
public health department by 43 (4.3%), and other sources
by 18 (1.8%); 16 (1.6%) did not know and 3 (0.3%) did not
answer. Overall, 418 (41.8%) indicated a high level of con-
fidence in their physicians’ ability to recognize symptoms
of smallpox, 291 (29.1%) a medium level of confidence,
177 (17.7%) a low level of confidence, and 42 (4.2%) no
confidence; 68 (6.8%) did not know, and 5 (0.5%) did not
answer. 
Conclusions
Most Australian adults interviewed in this national sur-
vey reported medium-to-high concern about the risk of a
bioterrorism attack in Australia (57.4%) and believed that
human smallpox cases had occurred in the past 5 years
(60.6%). This finding may explain the general willingness
to accept vaccination as a precautionary measure in the
absence of a bioterrorism event (7). This finding is similar
to that of a US survey, which indicated a strong communi-
ty desire for precautionary vaccination against smallpox
(5). However, the general public is unlikely to be suffi-
ciently informed to balance the risks of a bioterrorism
event against the potential for harm from vaccination (8).
Given that the currently available smallpox vaccine must
produce a significant lesion to be considered effective and
commonly results in other adverse events, some severe,
mass vaccination as an antiterrorism strategy must be epi-
demiologically justified by a substantial risk (9–11).
Accurate information on smallpox vaccine adverse effects
must be made available to the Australian public, although
this information may affect acceptance of vaccination, as
was documented among potential medical first responders
in the United States (12).
Participants were unclear about their personal smallpox
vaccination status. Although respondents born after small-
pox vaccination was stopped in Australia were incorrect if
they believed that they had been vaccinated against small-
pox, 33% of this group falsely indicated that had been vac-
cinated. This belief may lead to a false sense of security in
the event of an actual bioterrorist attack with smallpox
virus. 
Despite the desire for precautionary vaccination, only
259 (62%) respondents who believed they were unvacci-
nated would accept smallpox vaccination if cases were
reported in Australia. A false belief that effective medical
treatment exists for smallpox, which was held by more
than half of the respondents, may influence decisions to
accept vaccination in response to locally occurring cases
(13). Public health authorities have a clear mandate to
improve the community’s knowledge of smallpox and
bioterrorism. These efforts must involve groups, particu-
larly the elderly and those with more education, who
appear more unwilling to accept indicated public health
measures.
General practitioners emerged as a pivotal group should
a bioterrorism event occur in Australia; respondents iden-
tified these medical professionals as the preferred source
of initial diagnosis and management and expressed a high
level of confidence in their ability to correctly diagnose
smallpox. This central role for general practitioners in
optimizing biopreparedness in Australia has previously
been hypothesized (14). Whether the community’s belief
in the ability and skills of general practitioners is justified
is unknown, and this aspect clearly warrants investigation
(15). Specific training courses for general practitioners that
heighten their clinical index of suspicion, introduce public
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health containment and surveillance principles, and
emphasize effective communication strategies should be
developed in Australia and accredited for continuing pro-
fessional development. 
Findings in this Australian survey are similar to those in
a survey in the United States, even though Australia has
not experienced a bioterrorism event. In the US study, a
similar proportion of respondents (63%) believed that
smallpox cases had occurred in the past 5 years, but a
greater proportion would accept precautionary vaccination
(61%) and a slightly lower proportion (52%) would go to
their own physician for diagnosis and care (5). The partic-
ipation rate of 63% for this survey was similar to that in the
US study (65%). 
This national survey found that the Australian public
holds many inaccurate beliefs about smallpox and small-
pox vaccination, and this misinformation could negatively
affect response to a bioterrorist event. General practition-
ers were identified as the primary point of care and should
become an important focus of bioterrorism response plan-
ning in Australia. 
This study was supported by a merit research grant from
James Cook University.
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